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After Testing: I
N
ursesand other health care providers in-
volved in HIV testing are required to pro-
vide pre- and post-test counseling in accor-
dance with guidelines from the Center for
Disease Control (CDC, 1992). Clients who
test positive are extensively counseled and
educated on the nature of the virus, its modes of
transmission, the need to practice "safer sex," and the
obligation to advise sexual (and needle) partners
(Preston, 1989). Some individuals do not inform their
partners and this presents an urgent dilemma: Is a nurse
bound by a client's right to privacy not to advise that
client's partner of his or her HIV infection? Or does the
duty to warn, and thus prevent possible harm to others,
supersede confidentiality in this case?
This situation involves two competing societal val-
ues: the rights of the individual and the rights of the
public as a whole. Individual rights, such as liberty and
privacy, are the foundation of our society. At the same
time, the public's health and safety, which constitute
state interests, need to be secured (Northrop, 1988). Yet
it is unclear just how much that state may control
individual behavior to protect
the public. At this point, there
is no statute that requires health
care providers to warn exposed
third parties of the risks associ-
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ated with their partners' infections (Mel rae, 1990).
California passed a law effective January 1, 1988 that
allows doctors to directly inform spouses, but notifica-
tion is not mandatory; a few other states have similar
laws (Killian, 1990; Melroe, 1990).
Standard public health measures
seen as counterproductive
Public health measures seem to favor the privacy of the
infected individual over the rights of informing the
third party. The CDC recommends a policy of voluntary
self-disclosure by the infected person (Reisman, 1988).
Education and voluntary testing have been established
as the only acceptable method of controlling the spread
of the virus (Brown, 1987). These policies are due in
large part to the nature of the disease. Such epidemic
control measures as mandatory testing, contact tracing,
and quarantines that have been used in the past are
considered counterproductive with the HIV virus
(Lindell, 1987).
What, then, is the obligation of the nurse who per-
forms HIV testing-or cares for infected persons in the
community-in regard to part-
ner notification when educa-
tion fails? Are the protocols set
by the nurse's employing facil-
ity morally and socially respon-
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sible to all parties involved, or is this indeed possible?
Aswith all dilemmas, there are no satisfactory answers.
However, because both individuals and whole societies
are affected by decisions of autonomy and confidenti-
ality, such issues need to be thoughtfully clarified and
considered, preferably before the need for a decision
presents itself (Donovan, 1991).
Confidentiality is the cornerstone of the nurse-client
relationship. Because it instills trust, promotes autonomy,
enables human relationships, and insures fidelity, it is
an inherent and respected ethical duty (Haddad, 1989).
Confidentiality allows clients to seek assistance without
fear of public disclosure, preserves the client's right to
self-determination, and facilitates free disclosure of
information (Brown, 1987). Anurse who discloses privi-
leged information violates the client's rights to privacy
and autonomy, and jeopardizes the nurse-client rela-
tionship, threatening the quality and effectiveness of
further nursing care (Reisman, 1988).
Breaking confidentiality
can result in ostracism
Confidentiality is particularly crucial for HlV positive
clients. Breaking confidentiality can result in loss of
employment, eviction from housing, denial of medical
insurance, ostracism from the community, and disown-
ment by family and friends for the seropositive client
(Preston, 1989). People at risk for HIV are often already
members of groups subject to prejudice and discrimina-
tion (Gostin & Curran, 1987).
Knowing that partners could be notified if test results
came back positive could cause a lack of trust in the
health profession as a whole, and could cripple
the voluntary testing program (Mel roe, 1990).
Many at-risk persons may not voluntarily get
tested, knowing that confidentiality could be
broken. This would seriously impede the over-
all public health goal of decreasing the spread
of the virus, because more people would be
ignorant of their infectiousness, as would be
their sexual partners (Melroe, 1990). Further, it
is conceivable that this practice would encour-
agemore anonymous sexual behavior, to avoid
being named and traced (Reisman, 1988).
The ANA's Code for Nurses (1987) maintains
that the nurse safeguards the client's right to
privacy by protecting confidential information.
The right to privacy and the right to autonomy
mandate personal control over information about one-
self, and control of access to that information. This is
extremely important for HlV-infected clients, who are
definitely at risk of harm from disclosure of this
information (Reisman, 1988).
The exceptions to safeguarding
confidentiality
The role of the health care provider is to maintain and
promote health. If information exists that will directly
harm another individual's health, then the duty to warn
concept supports the health care provider in warning
the third party, despite ethical and moral imperatives of
confidentiality (Mel roe, 1990). According to the ANA's
Code for Nurses (1987), there may be exceptions to
safeguarding confidentiality when innocent parties are
in direct jeopardy.
Legally, the health care provider is not bound to
report a person who may be transmitting a communi-
cable disease. However, court cases have set precedent
that place liability on health care providers to warn
persons at risk. The California Supreme Court's Tarasoff
v. The Regents of the University of California, in 1976,
found a psychologist liable for failure to warn a third
party of his patient's intention to murder her (Tarasoff
v. The Regents of the University of California, 1976). In
regard to communicable diseases, courts have recog-
nized the need for public safety by repeatedly ruling
that a physician has the duty to warn others of their risk
of infection (Gostin & Curran, 1987; Melroe, 1990).
Is the duty of confidentiality
unconditional?
The immediate function of the duty to warn is to protect
the health of those at risk. The second reason to warn is
to protect the public from the spread of a deadly,
devastating disease. When the rights or interests ofthe
public come into conflict with the individual's right to
confidentiality, society takes precedence over the client
(Northrop, 1988; Reisman, 1988). According to this
argument, withholding information subjects the gen-
eral public to greater risk of contracting the disease.
Persons unaware that they have been infected have the
potential to expose many others before they themselves
have symptoms, perpetuating the spread of the disease
(Kirkman & Bell, 1989). Also, providing for the confi-
The immediate Function of the duty towarn is to protect the health of thoseat risk. The second reason to warn is to
protect the public From the spread of a deadly,
devastating disease. When the rights or
interests of the public come into conFlict with
the individual's right to conFidentiality, society
takes precedence over the client.
dentiality of seropositive clients will not protect them
from the devastation of the disease anyway (Kirkman &
Bell, 1989). Since mandatory testing and strict quaran-
tine of infected persons has been rejected as a method
of slowing the disease, partner notification, whether by
the client or the health care provider, is the only way to
directly reach persons who maybe spreading the disease
unknowingly.
Although where the nurse lives and works mandates the
required action, the question remains: What is the
moral obligation of the nurse to the seropositive client
who refuses to tell test results, and to the third parties
involved, and at the same time protect the public from
the spread of this fatal disease?
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One of the main considerations of this dilemma is
whether the duty of confidentiality is unconditional.
Ethically, there are circumstances under which a health
care provider is obligated to violate patient confidenti-
ality. These depend on the client, disease, moral obliga-
tion, and rights of the moral agents (the client, health
care provider, and third party) involved (DeSimone,
Piscaneschi, Jaffe, & Engelberg, 1986).
In the case of HlV infection, despite educative efforts,
the client does not want to reveal his/her disease and
perhaps socially unaccepted life-style to a third party
who is at risk of contracting this same disease. The
motive for this reluctance would have to be stronger
than the logic presented by education-perhaps revenge
or fear of revenge, fear of abandonment, fear that others
such as employers or insurance companies would find
out, or mental incapacity. If confidentiality were bro-
ken in order to warn the third party, the health care
provider would have to be particularly careful not to
mention the seropositive client's name, although to
some this would not protect their identity. Further, the
seropositive client would need to be advised in writing
before the disclosure took place.
Interms of the disease, AIDS is almost always fatalwith no cure. The virus thought to be responsible,HlV, is often transmitted by apparently healthypeople engaged in intimate acts that public health
measures cannot directly control nor prevent. Mass
education may well be the only answer to controlling
the epidemic, but until all people know how to protect
themselves or are monogamous, there are always going
to be third parties who have been unknowingly ex-
posed. Without knowing their test status, infected third
parties may not know they are infecting others. Addi-
tionally, such individuals can usually benefit from
early treatment.
Some feel that the health care provider's sole moral
obligation is to the infected client (Laufrnan, 1989). I
believe the health care provider's moral obligation is to
all parties who may have been exposed sinee there is no
way to know if one is infected unless one is tested.
Withholding this information to protect client confi-
dentiality, particularly for clients who are refusing their
moral obligation, is a misuse of professional power. The
third party must, however, be well educated on the need
for testing as well as all the other components of pre-
and posttest counseling.
So far, this discussion has been limited to two moral
agents: the seropositive client, who for justified or
unjustified reasons refuses to notify his or her contacts,
and the health care provider, caught between the bind
of duty to confidentiality and duty to warn others who
may be at risk. The third moral agent, the third party,
requires some examination. Pirst, who are the third
parties? In some cases they may be wives of bisexual
men. Others may be short- or long-time homosexual
partners. And others may be the multiple nameless
clients of an infected male or female prostitute. Ironi-
cally, the third parties hardest to trace, clients of pros-
titutes, are the ones posing the greatest public health
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risk, while the most accessible third parties are the wives
and lovers of infected individuals, and whose contacts
are more limited.
Reconcile conflicting rights on
case-by-case basis
Whether a professional policy of partner notification
will decrease voluntary testing can only be answered
with time, perhaps in such states as California and New
York that protect physicians who warn spouses. If
partner notifications are only done when there is strong
evidence that a third party is in danger of being un-
knowingly infected, and carried out in a way that
protects the seropositive client's rights and privacy as
much as possible, voluntary testing will probably notbe
significantly affected. The challenge to nurses is to
assure continued social and legal protection of the
professional ethic of confidentiality and the seropositive
client's right to privacy, as well as the right of third
parties to be warned of possible harm. Only in this way
can ethical choices be compassionately made on a case
by case basis. (II
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